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Between historical heritage and policy learning: 
the reform of public research funding systems 
in Poland, 1989–2007 
Julita Jabłecka and Benedetto Lepori 
This paper provides an account of the reform of the public research funding system in Poland between 
1989 and 2007, a period which includes the dramatic change after the breakdown of the Communist 
regime with the creation of a completely new system of research funding, yet still characterized by 
strong centralization; a lock-in phase until 2000 where only minimal changes happened; and a new 
reform period afterwards leading to a more decentralized and layered structure with a better separation 
between research policy and research funding. Our analysis displays strong elements on continuity and 
path dependency in this evolution, but at the same time the lasting influence of the western European 
model of research policy in the long run (especially after Poland joined the European Union); 
moreover, it shows how deeply reform in research funding has been embedded in the national context 
and in the whole process of reform of political institutions in the country. 
HIS PAPER PROVIDES an account of the 
reform of the public research funding system 
in Poland between 1989 and 2007. The 
changes immediately after the collapse of the  
Communist regime in the years 1989–1991 were 
revolutionary and led to the creation of a new organ-
izational structure — the State Committee for Scien-
tific Research — which took the responsibility for 
almost the whole research budget, as well as for the 
establishment of a new set of funding instruments. 
Despite the fact that Polish reform has never been 
explicitly proclaimed by the policy-makers to be in-
spired by any particular example of research funding 
organization from abroad, a look at the debate shows 
that an important element was reference to the  
research council model implemented in other Euro-
pean countries and the USA. 
However, the organizational setting implemented 
in Poland differed significantly from all other known 
solutions at the beginning of 1990s. From 1991 for 
almost a decade only very minor changes took place, 
while since 2001 the system has witnessed a sub-
stantial but more gradual change towards solutions 
more similar to those found in most European  
countries, with the establishment of a research min-
istry and first steps towards a separation between re-
search policy and allocation of research grants. 
This account raises a number of broad questions 
which are of general interest for scholars studying 
research policy. A first issue concerns the factors 
explaining the evolution of Polish research policy 
and, especially, why the system was so stable for 
almost a decade after the radical reforms at the 
breakdown of the Communist regime. Second, one 
would like to understand why the system created in 
1991 was so different from in other European  
countries despite reference to models abroad; and 
how lessons about ideas and policy instruments have 
been incorporated by actors into the domestic politi-
cal process. Third, it is relevant to look at to what 
extent the chosen model is related to national speci-
ficities, but also to the heritage of the Communist 
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system (despite formal rejection of its principles  
during the reform process) and how international 
policy transfer influenced this path (both in the early 
reform phases and in the recent changes). This is 
thus mostly a national case study, even if it should 
be seen in the broader context of the Europeaniza-
tion of central and eastern European countries. 
These questions relate to more general concep-
tions about institutional and policy change, which 
we discuss in the second section, to provide some 
theoretical grounding to our analysis. The third sec-
tion presents a historical overview of the evolution 
of Polish research funding in the considered period, 
while the fourth section is devoted to a discussion of 
the empirical results in the light of three main con-
cepts, namely path dependency, policy learning and 
policy streams. Finally, we provide some general 
conclusions on patterns of change in research policy 
across time. 
This study has been done in the framework of a 
comparative project on public funding of research in 
central and eastern European countries funded by the 
European Union 6th Framework Program project, 
PRIME. Information on the Polish case includes the 
analysis of published articles, interviews, official 
documents and internal unpublished documents from 
government organizations, as well as the reconstruc-
tion of main research funding flows and their evolu-
tion in the past decade (Lepori et al, 2009). Another 
source of information is interviews with the main 
political actors involved in the reforming process. 
Finally, one of us actively participated in the reform 
in early 1990 and thus the account of changes also 
includes participant observation. 
Theoretical approaches 
Scholars have developed different approaches to ex-
plain institutional and policy changes. Already lim-
ited to institutionalists approaches, a well-known 
review of the field distinguishes between historical 
institutionalism, rational-choice institutionalism and 
sociological institutionalism (Hall and Taylor, 
1996), even if other reviews might use a slightly dif-
ferent terminology (Peters, 1995). While these ap-
proaches agree in attributing a key role to 
institutions in the evolution of policy domains, they 
assume largely different positions concerning two 
key aspects of institutional change: 
1. The relationship between actor’s choices and be-
havior on the one hand; institutions on the other. 
Rational-choice theories largely consider institu-
tions as exogenous sets of rules which limit ac-
tor’s choices, but then conceive of actors as 
rational and behaving strategically to maximize 
their utility inside this rule system (North, 1990). 
Sociological institutionalism embraces a broader 
view of institutions as cognitive and social con-
structs endogenous to the system itself, while an 
actor’s beliefs and preferences are also institu-
tionally constructed. Their behavior is thus driven 
by conformity to social norms and values more 
than by individual actor’s interests. 
2. How institutions are generated and change across 
time. Rational-choice approaches consider institu-
tions as purposeful constructions by actors to or-
ganize collective activities, but also to distribute 
and manage power (card decking; McCubbins et 
al, 1987). Thus institutions change or break down 
as soon as they become dysfunctional, or when al-
ternative institutional arrangements provide actors 
with a more attractive solution. Sociological and 
historical institutionalists emphasize the lasting 
stability of institutions even in the light of changing 
technological, social, economic and political envi-
ronments, changing stakeholders’ preferences and 
institutional competition (Stacey and Rittberger, 
2003: 867) and the extent to which institutional 
change is bound by existing norms and beliefs. In 
this context, appropriateness is more important 
than functionality for institutional change. 
There are good reasons to consider these approaches 
as more complementary than alternative in the 
analysis of major policy changes (Hall and Taylor, 
1996). This is particularly relevant when studying 
radical policy reforms like those in central and east-
ern Europe (Greener, 2002) where we are faced with 
periods with very different dynamics of change. 
In the next section, we provide a discussion of 
three issues which are central for our account of Pol-
ish research policy. These are: 
1. The temporal dimension of changes in political 
institutions and the influence of history on today’s 
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political institutions (path dependency). 
2. The role of ideas in the policy processes and how 
actors learn to address new problems (policy 
learning). 
3. The role of political actors in shaping policy 
change, especially when specific opportunities 
arise to promote major reforms (policy entrepre-
neurs). 
The legacy of history and path dependency 
Historical institutionalism has largely focused on the 
enduring effect of the history on today’s configura-
tion of political institutions and provided rich de-
scriptions of how national systems keep their 
distinctive characteristics because of past events 
which constrain today’s choices (Steinmo et al, 
1992). Beyond this largely descriptive approach, 
work on path dependency has sought to provide a 
more rigorous foundation to the idea that ‘history 
matters’, by drawing on parallel work by economists 
on technological trajectories (David, 1985; Arthur, 
1989). 
The notion of path dependency has been grounded 
in the existence of positive feedback and increasing 
returns; past choices not only constrain the range of 
options, but favour choices which reinforce the 
structures in place providing stability to a course of 
events (path) selected at the beginning. In econom-
ics, positive feedback is explained through techno-
logical irreversibility and collective effects, while in 
political sciences these have been sought in the 
characteristics of political institutions (Pierson, 
2000). The moment of setting the path dependency 
into motion represents a critical juncture (Collier and 
Collier, 1991), which is characterized by the adop-
tion of a particular institutional arrangement from 
among two or more alternatives. In this moment, 
small and contingent causes have large and long-
term consequences (Pierson, 2000; Mahoney, 2000). 
Many authors suggest that the initial phase is charac-
terized by unconstrained choice, while others state 
that history always matters and behavior occurs in a 
specific historical setting and is influenced by it 
(Sydow and Koch, 2005: 10). 
Unlike sociological institutionalism, which tends 
to embrace a view of institutional change in terms of 
punctuated equilibrium with long phases of stability 
interrupted by revolutionary changes (Scott et al, 
2000), path dependency is compatible with gradual 
change, whose direction is bound by past trajectories 
(Thelen, 1999). However, in the strongest versions 
path transformation is presumed to be highly 
unlikely except through rare radical ruptures often 
associated with violent external shocks (Djelic and 
Quack, 2007: 161). 
The recent literature concentrates on mechanisms 
of change. Pierson (2000) sees external shocks as the 
main source of large-scale institutional change. 
Other scholars have shown other circumstances 
when a change of path occurs: if a paradigm shift 
takes place (Hall, 1993), if power-holders are suc-
cessful in constructing the need to change that would 
legitimize path-departing reforms (Cox, 2001). 
Moreover, empirical work shows that path transfor-
mation of political institutions cannot always be 
traced to single ruptures, but may come about 
through gradual succession and a series of incre-
mental steps and junctures (Djelic and Quack, 2007). 
Conversion is a process in which existing institu-
tions are reoriented to serve new purposes or reflect 
new power dynamics; in a layering process an insti-
tution is changed incrementally as additional rules or 
structures are added on the top of what already exist 
(Thelen, 2003). 
When looking at central and eastern European 
countries from this perspective a number of relevant 
questions emerge. The first concerns the features of 
political decisions in the critical moment at the 
breakdown of the Communist regime (Stark and 
Burszt, 1992), which is an almost ideal candidate for 
a critical juncture setting a new path into motion. A 
related question concerns to what extent decisions in 
this revolutionary phase were influenced by history 
and existing institutions. Finally, one would look at 
the characteristics of the path (inertia vs. gradual 
change) and to what extent these have been deter-
mined by the choice of the path itself. 
Policy learning and international policy transfer 
The concept of policy learning relates to another di-
mension of policy change, namely how policy actors 
make a deliberate attempt to adjust the goals or 
techniques of policy in response to past experience 
or new information (Hall, 1993; Braun and Ben-
ninghoff, 2003). It is thus rooted in traditions focus-
ing on the role of ideas as driving forces for policy 
(Heclo, 1974), but also in sociological institutional-
ism where institutions identify and then adapt to a 
changing environment through a trial-and-error 
process, while changes in policies and practices need 
to be legitimated by new rationales and beliefs (Ol-
sen and Peters, 1996). 
The literature has distinguished between orders of 
learning (Hall, 1993): 
• In first-order learning, only changes in the settings 
of policy instruments take place; these are likely 
to be incremental, as a result of routinized, satis-
fying behavior. 
• Second-order learning occurs when the instru-
ments used to achieve policy goals are modified 
but the paradigm goals remain the same. 
• Third-order learning means a paradigm shift, 
when the framework of ideas for interpreting the 
world is modified. These frameworks determine 
the goals that policy-makers attempt to achieve as 
well as the nature of the problems they attempt to 
address (Greener, 2002: 163). Third order learn-
ing is considered difficult to achieve and mostly 
related to external shocks and profound changes 
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in the power of different coalitions of actors  
sharing the same basic beliefs (advocacy coali-
tions; Sabatier, 1987). 
The breakdown of the Communist regime is a case 
where actors in research policy are confronted with a 
new problem or puzzle, namely how to design a 
framework for research policy in a radically differ-
ent social and economic context; moreover, pro-
found changes in the composition of advocacy 
coalitions take place. It is thus highly relevant to in-
quire how actors learned to address this problem and 
to what extent the coming to power of groups mar-
ginalized under the Communist regime contributed 
to this process and influenced the nature of solutions 
borne. 
A further issue concerns the extent to which ac-
tors in this process made use of ideas and solutions 
already existent in other countries, especially the 
United States and western Europe, thus linking the 
concept of policy learning with the literature on  
the processes involved in international policy trans-
fer and policy diffusion (Dolowitz and Marsh, 
2000). This tradition distinguishes between different 
gradations of transfer, from direct transfer of policy 
instruments and programs (hard transfer) to the soft 
transfer of ideas, concepts and attitudes (Smith, 
2002: 6). Most authors assume that policy transfer 
results from a rational judgment of decision-makers: 
we can find (bounded) rationality in a selection 
process of policy ideas from the past or from other 
settings (including other countries) and in adaptation 
processes through imitation, copying or modification 
(Stone, 2000; Rose,1993; James and Lodge, 2003). 
Other authors stress the organizational–cultural 
processes involved in learning, which often have 
more to do with rituals and legitimacy than with a 
process of optimization (Argyris and Shon, 1978). 
Policy processes, streams and entrepreneurs 
Policy change obviously has a process dimension, 
namely through which processes and sequences of 
actions problems come to the policy agenda (prob-
lem stream; Kingdon, 2003), policy alternatives are 
formulated (policy stream) and finally how political 
decisions are finally taken and implemented (politi-
cal stream). While rational-choice approaches con-
ceive this process as rational with actors looking for 
the best solutions to emerging problems, normative 
institutionalism assumes that the repertoire of an-
swers to policy problems is largely driven by solu-
tions already in place. Thus, there are strong 
cognitive and intellectual limitations of the actor’s 
behaviour (Olsen and Peters, 1996; Braun and Ben-
ninghoff, 2003), implying that they do not make op-
timal choices but tend accept satisfying solutions 
which match their beliefs and expectations. 
In its extreme version this approach considers 
problems and solutions as two independent streams, 
where solutions are developed whether or not they  
respond to a problem and, once a problem is put on the 
political agenda, solutions are picked up from the 
available set rather than sought through a rational 
search process (garbage can model; Cohen et al, 
1972; Kingdon, 2003). The political process creates 
policy windows, open for only short periods, where 
(largely by chance) different conditions for policy 
change take place. Alternatives proposed are associ-
ated with a problem perceived as significant; pro-
posed solutions receive the direct backing of major 
political advocates having an interest in promoting 
them (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993); the moment 
(political and economic) is favorable, the alternatives 
chosen are technically feasible, and the policy ideas 
are not too difficult to explain to the public and to  
decision-makers. In these situations, some individuals 
— called policy entrepreneurs (Kingdon, 2003) — 
typically play a critical role in pushing for the re-
forms, in promoting new ideas and, finally, in tying 
together the different streams by negotiating accept-
able solutions for the involved actors. This account of 
policy change lets two major characteristics of policy 
entrepreneurs emerge: the patience to wait for the 
right moment for pushing for reforms (which cannot 
be foreseen in advance), and the pragmatism to pro-
mote a satisfying rather than an optimal solution. 
A brief history of Polish research policy  
and funding, 1989–2007 
Before World War II, the Polish system of higher 
education and research was based on a western pat-
tern. Most research effort was concentrated in uni-
versities organized according to the Humboldtian 
liberal university model with academic freedom, re-
search autonomy and self-governance; such a system 
was seen as the most functional for science 
(Małkowski, 1992). 
After World War II, during the era of Communist 
rule, the organization and financing of R&D was 
subordinated to political directives and central plan-
ning. Science was subdivided into the higher educa-
tion sector; branch institutes reporting to various 
ministries; and the sector of the Polish Academy of 
Sciences (PAS), which took at the same time the 
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functions of a learned society, an administrative 
body and a research sector with its own institutes. 
The system of centrally planned large research pro-
grams, set up in 1971, tried to overcome the sectoral 
division of research and to enable implementation of 
social priorities. This system gradually encompassed 
all R&D institutions (Amsterdamski and Jabłecka, 
1993). 
The responsibility for science policy and for a 
heavy and detailed centralized control of science be-
longed to the State Committee for Science and 
Technological Progress (KNIPT), more precisely to 
its executive presidium, composed of government 
members. The Office for Technological Progress 
and Implementations (UPTIW), headed by the  
under-secretary of state, at the same time also the 
KNIPT secretary, had responsibilities similar to a 
ministry of science. As we shall see, this organiza-
tion was to play a relevant role in the reforms. 
The reforms of 1989–1991 
The process of change started after the political 
break of 1989, when Tadeusz Mazowiecki formed a 
new government. The elaboration of a new legisla-
tion on a research funding system was the undertak-
ing of KNIPT chaired by Vice-Prime Minister,  
Jan Janowski, and Under-Secretary of State, Stefan 
Amsterdamski, the head of the KNIPT Office  
(UPTIW). In September 1989 the KNIPT chairman 
set up a governmental advisory team headed by W 
Findeisen to prepare guidelines for a new law. In 
February 1990 the government adopted the guide-
lines, recommending that further legislative work be 
undertaken. 
The reform of the research funding system pro-
posed by the KNIPT chairman was based on princi-
ples which changed radically the pre-reform policy 
assumptions (Amsterdamski and Jabłecka, 1993). 
First, the administrative governance over science 
would be replaced with joint efforts on the part of 
the government and the research community in 
terms of defining science policy and its funding. To 
this end, it was proposed that a council for scientific 
research (its name later changed for formal require-
ments into a ‘state committee’) should be established 
affiliated to the Council of Ministers, with the  
majority of members elected by the research com-
munity. 
Second, different funding instrument were fore-
seen for basic and applied research, managed by two 
separated council committees. Competition for peer-
reviewed research projects was proposed as the basis 
for the allocation of government funding, while ba-
sic research was to be funded also through institu-
tional (statutory) funding. Scientific excellence was 
intended as an important criterion for funding, ena-
bling the introduction of structural changes of re-
search institutions. Moreover, the commercialization 
of research results should not be funded by the sci-
ence budget. 
Third, the influence of the ministerial levels and 
intermediary bureaucratic levels on government-
funded research should have been eliminated and the 
funds allocated by the council would be transferred 
directly to the research institutions and teams. 
The task of preparation of the proposal was trans-
ferred to a task force in UPTIW headed by Stefan 
Amsterdamski. After extensive debates at the 
KNIPT meetings, the final draft was completed and 
after inter-ministerial consultation sent to the par-
liament. Work on the draft bill in the relevant par-
liamentary committee started in September 1990. 
During the legislative process a number of elements 
were formulated with greater precision, but there 
were very few essential changes including those on 
active voting rights to a collegial body composed of 
(elected) representatives of the scientific community 
(the KBN), extended to doctorate holders, alongside 
professors. 
The KBN received at its disposal the whole sci-
ence budget and was empowered with a dual role: 
the strategic responsibilities of a ministry of research 
in research policy and funding tasks usually man-
aged by research councils. The committee’s chair-
man was, at the same time, nominated by parliament 
as a member of the government. The deputy chair-
man, the secretary of the KBN, headed the KBN of-
fice, made up of administrative staff. At its highest 
structural level there was a KBN in the narrow 
sense, consisting of five ministers and 12 scientists 
elected by the scientific community, representing the 
disciplinary divisions of the Commission for Basic 
and for Applied Research. All decisions were made 
by the KBN members by voting while the chairman 
had only the right to veto, which could in turn be 
overruled by the KBN. Apart from representatives of 
business and local government, the commissions 
were composed of professors elected by the research 
community. Decisions concerning science policy 
were made by the KBN at the top level; decisions on 
institutional funding were made by the commissions; 
while the divisions appointed members of the sec-
tions evaluating research projects and decided on 
project funding. 
There were six channels of funding: 
1. The statutory (institutional) funding of research or-
ganizations, including higher education faculties; 
2. The investments; 
3. Research projects, (the grant system); 
4. Goal-oriented projects, initiated by potential busi-
ness users of results and co-funded by the KBN; 
5. International cooperation; and finally 
6. Activities supporting research. 
All financing, except funding for support activities, 
was granted directly to research entities or in-
vestigators. 
Besides the bill preparation the governmental task 
force worked on the funding instruments. The ar-
rangements of peer-review process and organization 
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of the grants and goal-oriented projects and provi-
sional system of institutional assessments were 
ready when the KBN was constituted in 1991. The 
other instruments were elaborated gradually in the 
next years. 
From stability to a new reform process 
For almost a decade after 1991 there were only in-
cremental changes of policy instruments. Further re-
forms began in 2000 with amendments to the Act on 
the KBN. The name of the KBN office was replaced 
by a ministry of science; then, the chairman of the 
KBN became the Minister for Science. He took over 
most of the KBN’s collegial authority and responsi-
bilities in the field of policy formulation and imple-
mentation (funding decisions), while the KBN itself 
became mainly an advisory body. A further impor-
tant change in 2002 was the delegation of responsi-
bility for targeted projects to the Society of 
Engineering Associations (such a possibility was in-
troduced in the 1991 Act but not used for more than 
a decade). 
The next step came from a new Minister of Sci-
ence after the government change in 2002. The 
elaboration of new regulations was finished in 2004 
after a extensive consultation process. The new Act 
on research funding, of 2004, kept a centralized 
structure in the form of the Ministry of Science and 
Information Technology with a research council 
(RC) connected to it. Ministry responsibility covered 
both strategic and executive decisions. The Research 
Council, which replaced the KBN, was an advisory 
body to the minister, in the areas of both policy for-
mulation and funding. For the first time, the chair-
man of the RC and the minister became separate 
positions; the latter gained decisive powers, includ-
ing all funding decisions, made upon the recommen-
dations of the RC. 
These changes were sometimes labelled as ‘a shift 
from the democratic model to the ministerial model’ 
and met with some resistance on the part of the aca-
demic community. The Act of 2004 also introduced 
new funding instruments such as development pro-
jects and projects of international cooperation within 
the European Union Framework Program (FP), as 
well as a national research FP funding research on 
policy-relevant themes. 
The process was continued by the next govern-
ment and led to two Acts: on the National Research 
and Development Centre (NCBR) and an amend-
ment to the Act on financing science. The new legis-
lation was prepared in 2006 and passed by the 
parliament in 2007. 
The NCBR is an agency, semi-independent from 
the ministry, funding strategic research programs 
which require cooperation between large research 
teams, as well as large facilities in applied sciences 
and technology, organizing peer review, supporting 
the mobility of scholars and fulfilling other tasks 
commissioned by the Minister of Science. The 
agency is financed from budgetary funds and from 
external money in the form of structural funds and 
private funding. The NCBR director is selected 
through open competition and is advised by a board 
made up of scientists and representatives of business 
and NCBR administrative staff. 
The ministry announced its willingness to con-
tinue the reforms and to establish a research council 
supporting basic research, an idea which was 
adopted by a new government established in 2007. 
The stated goal is thus in the next years to decentral-
ize the financing system, shifting financing and im-
plementation of research projects from the Ministry 
of Science to the newly established institutions. 
Creating the path: the radical reform and its 
historical heritage, 1989–1991 
Historical analysis leads to a periodization of Polish 
research policy in three phases, with very distinct 
patterns of change: a phase of radical change in a 
short time (1989–1991), a phase of substantial sta-
bility (1991–2000), and finally a sequence of more 
gradual changes leading to a further restructuring of 
research policy and funding (2000–2007). In the fol-
lowing, we analyze these phases through the lenses 
of the concepts introduced in the second section, 
thus addressing the following three question areas: 
1. Do we observe path dependency and path genera-
tion? Is historical evolution influenced by the 
past? 
2. How did policy actors/coalitions learn when faced 
with new political problems? How is this learning 
translated into practical solutions? 
3. How is the political process organized? What role 
did policy entrepreneurs have in promoting 
change? 
The historical roots of a paradigmatic change 
The period 1989–1991 can be characterized as a 
phase of paradigmatic change, where the basic con-
cepts of research policy and funding were profoundly 
modified. The Polish system switched from a highly 
centralized and state-controlled system to a ‘Republic 
of Science’ policy (Polanyi, 1962), where all deci-
sions concerning funding were in the hands of the 
KBN, based on principles of competition and evalua-
tion of scientific quality. The establishment of a new 
funding organization and new funding instruments 
constituted measures for achieving these new goals. 
This is coherent with concepts of policy change 
advocating that paradigmatic change is possible only 
in situations of external shocks, in this case the col-
lapse of the Communist system. Since the system of 
research funding was embedded in the whole macro-
system of national economy, its changes created a 
new environment which required the adjustment of 
research policy institutions. 
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However, this radical reform had roots in Polish 
history, both in the pre-Communist and in the Com-
munist period. First, a significant feature of most 
Polish citizens, and especially the research commu-
nity, was hostility toward and lack of confidence in 
the state and central administration, developed in the 
period of oppression of Poland between the end of 
the 18th century and World War I, as well as during 
45 years of Communism, which was never accepted 
at least by the scientific elites. On the other hand the 
period of Poland’s sovereignty between 1918 and 
1939 saw the development of self-management of 
research institutions, and academic freedom formed 
academic preferences which survived the period of 
totalitarian regime among the scientific elites. Then, 
the atmosphere of distrust of all administration and 
resentments seriously affected the content of particu-
lar provisions (Amsterdamski, 1993). The proposed 
model of the KBN, with its separation from political 
and administrative influence, was based on these 
preferences. 
In Polish reform, creating a new path and reject-
ing the past resulted in a denial of every organiza-
tional and political principle, even if some of these 
principles, such as research funding by various sec-
toral departments or the involvement of politicians 
in science policy formulation, are common in de-
mocratic countries. 
Urgency and learning 
However, looking at the organizational structure, 
continuity with the Communist regime appears quite 
strong. The organization of the KBN was similar to 
the Communist KNIPT and both settings represented 
highly centralized models of research funding 
(Lepori et al, 2009). Of course the basic principles 
of research policy and the role of the research com-
munity were different. However, one should not un-
dervalue the importance of these institutional 
features in designing the interaction between policy 
and the research system (Bonaccorsi, 2007). 
We can advance some arguments to explain con-
tinuity of organizational structures vs. paradigmatic 
changes in the basic principles. A first relates to the 
fact that it would appear difficult to master at the 
same time paradigmatic changes both in basic prin-
ciples and in organizational structures, since this 
would exceed the cognitive capabilities of the in-
volved actors. A second relates to the limitations of 
policy learning when actors are faced with sudden 
and unexpected changes: we expect that learning 
takes place mostly by recombining existing solutions 
rather than by designing new ones and this is espe-
cially relevant for organizational structures, where 
there was no past tradition of alternative models. 
Notions such as the separation between policy and 
funding, delegation to independent agencies, and in-
termediaries were developed in research policy only 
after World War II to address the antinomy between 
steering by the state and autonomy of research in a 
more differentiated way (Braun, 2003) and thus had 
no roots in the Polish context. 
This framework also influenced the interpretation 
given to the American National Science Foundation 
model, which was seen as a single body funding  
basic research and governed by scientists rather than 
as a part of a more complex institutional setting of 
research policy. The short time available for reforms 
and the closure of these countries under the Com-
munist regime led to few opportunities for inter-
national transfer and learning, beyond the general 
reference to the research council idea, however rein-
terpreted to match the basic belief in the ‘Republic 
of Science’ and to make it credible. 
Moreover, the reform was undertaken in a situa-
tion of urgency and the priority was to finalize it as 
quickly as possible. Thus, there were voices in the 
group of reformers proposing different settings and 
pushing towards a polycentric model, with basic re-
search funded by a number of specialized discipli-
nary agencies, but they finally supported the 
proposed model as a starting point, assuming that it 
would gradually evolve towards a system closer to 
that of western European countries. 
This contrasts with the process for the develop-
ment of new funding instruments, especially of 
grants and goal-oriented projects, which was based 
on intensive international policy learning, founded 
on detailed information about funding rules and peer 
review of projects, as well as deeper knowledge 
gathered during a study tour in the USA and Canada. 
The choice of arrangements was based on several 
criteria: consistency with the cultural pattern of the 
prospective research council; general decision-
making rules; the solutions had to be the least vul-
nerable to the deviations and dysfunctions associated 
with habits developed during the several decades of 
the Communist system (Jabłecka, 1992). 
Tying together the reform: entrepreneurs,  
new and old elites 
To understand why such a radical reform was possi-
ble we need to look more precisely to the decision-
making process and to the involved actors. Of 
course, the intellectual roots of the reform came 
from scientific circles near Solidarity and especially 
from Society for the Advancement of Science 
(TPKN). Most opposition participants to the sub-
group on science in the spring 1989 round-table ne-
gotiations between the Communist government and 
Solidarity came from these circles. The group was 
chaired by Stefan Amsterdamski, an outstanding 
philosopher of science and a member of the TPKN 
with a strong academic reputation, who carried out 
research for several years in the USA, France and 
Germany and was familiar with the structure of US 
research funding agencies. 
Competing reform proposals soon emerged. One 
proposal was drafted by TPKN, another by the  
group of government experts led by Professor  
Poland 
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W Findeisen, former rector of Warsaw Technical 
University (Findeisen, 1993). However, in Decem-
ber 1989, Amsterdamski assumed the duty of the 
KNIPT secretary and thus became the main driving 
force for the reforms. The KNIPT chairman, Jan Ja-
nowski, subsequently co-opted some new members 
to a composition inherited after Communist rules, 
including several TPKN members, to ensure a bal-
ance between the representatives of various institu-
tional interests. The KNIPT was an empowered 
decision-making authority instead of having advi-
sory functions and had to legitimize the project in 
the scientific community. 
Co-opting the opposition elites in the organiza-
tional structure inherited from the Communist re-
gime was then a key for the success of the reform 
process, since it led to the merging of the different 
proposals and avoided open conflicts. It helps also to 
explain why the new ideas on research policy were 
infused in organizational structures inherited from 
the Communist regime, thus effectively transform-
ing the KNIPT into the predecessor of the KBN. 
Moreover, because the KNIPT decision-making 
procedures were not determined by any regulation, 
the vice-prime minister was free to introduce proce-
dures of voting which made the rejection of the re-
form proposal practically impossible. Once the 
proposal was approved by the KNIPT, external 
groups refrained from requesting additional changes 
for fear of blocking the reform. Thus, in a political 
system which after the Communist period lacked the 
procedural rules to manage an open and democratic 
debate, the reform process was managed in a central-
ized and authoritarian way inside the old structures. 
In fact the reformers had hardly any choice, since 
developing a consultation process might have de-
layed the reform. 
This account displays the central role of a few po-
litical entrepreneurs — KNIPT Secretary Amster-
damski and KNIPT Chairman Janowski — to tie 
together the different reforms streams and to manage 
the process in such a way that blocking became 
nearly impossible. Moreover, from this perspective 
the double face of the reform — infusing new politi-
cal ideas in an organizational structure largely inher-
ited from the past system — can be seen as a skilful 
compromise, answering to the (mostly intellectual) 
requests of the opposition, while at the same time 
keeping the interests of the research units which 
were funded through the old centralistic system of 
research programs. 
From lock-in to a new reform 
The reforms of 1991 were followed by a decade of 
stability, where only minor adaptation of the re-
search policy institutions took place. This is in sharp 
contrast to the patterns shown in countries such as 
Estonia and the Czech Republic, where reforms 
were more gradual and took places during most of 
the 1990s (Lepori et al, 2009). 
The institutional set-up and funding arrangements 
were also immune to suggestion of more important 
change, including recommendations of experts from 
international organizations (OECD, 1995) who ad-
vised structural changes. Moreover, TPKN and Na-
tional Conciliatory Committee for Science Solidarity 
documents prepared in 1989, which made mention 
of the necessity for further reforms (such as the crea-
tion of a pluralist system of specialist research coun-
cils), and discussions during the TPKN meetings at 
the beginning of 1990 were ignored. 
There are in our view at least three main reasons 
to explain this stability. First, while initially the 
KBN enjoyed rather modest support from the scien-
tific community which, after several decades of au-
thoritarian regime, had little confidence in the 
change initiated by the new government even if de-
mocratically elected, the reform was quickly seen as 
satisfactory by the scientific community itself. The 
most often-mentioned advantages were: competitive 
funding of the best quality research, uniform criteria 
of review and greater freedom in deciding about the 
research topics (Jabłecka, 1995). Even if the stake-
holders criticized some solutions or procedures, the 
advantages were more important than deficiencies. 
In a way, the benchmark for assessing the reform 
was the Communist system and thus it was clear that 
the new system was preferable; only later, compari-
son with other countries showed that organizational 
models were possible. Collective learning of a 
broader range of solutions required time and more 
intensive confrontation with other countries. 
Second, one should emphasize the coherency and 
stability of the advocacy coalition supporting this 
model. Thus, the composition of the KBN clearly 
favored representation of institutional and discipli-
nary interests, which were themselves beneficiaries 
of funding decisions. The double role of the KBN in 
policy formulation and in the allocation of resources 
provided these interest groups with control on the 
policy framework driving the funding decisions, as 
well as a strong incentive against delegating funding 
decisions to autonomous agencies. Stability of key 
people on the posts of chairman and secretary of the 
KBN also characterized this phase. 
Third, stability can be seen as a side effect of 
dramatic change, since the set-up of the new funding 
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system took several years in a trial-and-error pro-
cess. Faced with the costs of learning the new sys-
tem, actors had thus relatively little resources to 
invest in promoting new changes. Moreover, the un-
certainty about the effects of the reform meant that it 
was difficult to ground proposals of change in some 
kind of evidence and this hindered the KBN chair-
man from any change requiring legislative process. 
As Amsterdamski et al put it in 1994: 
in the present situation in the country, and 
given the current composition of parliament, it 
is not likely that any amendments of the rele-
vant laws will help to speed up the reform 
process. Quite the contrary in fact: it is very 
likely that such amendments will freeze this 
process and in some cases even reverse it. 
(Amsterdamski et al, 1994: 35) 
Reforms in a new context 
The most recent phase of change was triggered by an 
external event, namely the new Constitutional Law 
of 1997, which required that responsibility for po-
litical decisions had to be assumed by the parlia-
ment, the government or ministries and not by a 
collegial body such as the KBN. This opportunity 
was seized by the KBN chairman to assume most 
decision-making power and to reduce the KBN to an 
advisory body to the Minister of Science. Even 
strong opponents of the ministerial model could not 
protest against argumentation connected to the es-
tablishment of legal order. While the entrepreneurial 
ability of the KBN chairman made possible this 
change of path, one would argue that bringing back 
political authorities was an inevitable step in the de-
velopment of a mature research policy, which (with 
different settings) has taken place in almost all de-
veloped countries. 
The progressive stabilization of the Polish State 
and the growth of a democratic society and of a 
market economy progressively created the ground 
for breaking the lock-in in the KBN model, which 
was based on vested interest but did not answer to 
some basic requirements of mature research policies. 
The progressive opening of Poland and more fre-
quent exchanges with western European countries 
were relevant in this process, most reforms in the 
following years being motivated by the need to 
adopt models similar to other European countries. 
The process of reform was also different from in 
1989–1991: it was more gradual and based on a 
wide consultation of actors and building consensus 
around shared solutions. The three ministers of sci-
ence during this period had the lead in this process, 
but avoided direct confrontation with KBN interests 
and made large use of juridical arguments and com-
parisons with other countries to motivate the reform. 
Confrontation was not on paradigms — the basic 
principle of autonomy of science and of scientific 
quality were not in question — but on functions  
and organizational structures, like the need to  
separate the functions of Minister of Science and 
Science Council Chairman; in the KBN model the 
minister was not a reliable partner to other ministries 
as a representative of science but without formal  
authority. 
Not only did this make confrontation and policy 
learning between different groups easier, as policy 
learning theories predict, but also it made it impossi-
ble for KBN members to hide their interests behind 
the ideological debate on the autonomy of science. 
In the last round of the consultation process almost 
all consulted organizations stressed overall support 
for changes on condition that the principles of selec-
tive funding of research grants and selective funding 
of research institutions based on a peer-review pro-
cess or evaluation procedures of scientific excellence 
would be preserved. Thus, giving back the power in 
research policy design to the minister should be 
counterbalanced by a progressive delegation of 
funding decisions to independent agencies. 
Graduality of this process was also crucial to 
overcome the fears of scientific institutions, which 
trusted the KBN. It started in 2002 with delegation 
of funding of goal-oriented projects from small and 
medium-sized enterprises, and continued in 2004 
with strategic research programs, while only in the 
last phase responsibility will be delegated for the 
most sensible area, namely the grant system for ba-
sic research projects. 
Conclusions 
Conclusions can be discussed at two different levels, 
one pertaining to the characteristics of the transition 
in central and eastern European countries in the field 
of research policy and one looking to more general 
lessons on the evolution of research policies overall. 
What emerges from our case study on Poland is 
that the reform process after the breakdown of the 
Communist regime was strongly rooted in the  
national context of the country, in its history and in 
existing institutions and organizational forms both 
from the pre-Communist and from the Communist 
regimes. At least at the level of the overall design of 
research policy, transfer of solutions experimented 
in other countries was mostly limited to some gen-
eral ideas (such as the research council and the  
‘Republic of Science’), which were, however, essen-
tially used to legitimate arrangements inherited from 
domestic history. There are some good reasons to 
explain this institutional bricolage. Urgency meant 
that time and resources for a wider debate on differ-
ent solutions was impossible. The isolation of the 
country under the Communist regime meant that 
knowledge of other countries’ models was limited to 
a few personal experiences of scientists who had 
stays abroad (not necessarily in the most recent 
years). Finally, coherently with policy learning theo-
ries, the fundamental character of the reform made 
Poland 
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learning difficult, while change in policy rationales 
was brought about essentially by changes in the coa-
lition at the power. On the contrary, the parallel set-
up of new funding instruments, where the issue was 
more technical and there was less urgency to finalize 
the new solutions, was characterized by a more sys-
tematic process of learning where different models 
from other countries were compared and adapted to 
the specific context of the country. 
This leads to a slightly different interpretation of 
the reform process from a path-dependency perspec-
tive: while it is true that an external shock — the 
breakdown of the Communist regime — triggered a 
paradigmatic change, the repertoire of solutions 
available to actors to generate a new path was se-
verely limited and bound to the specific context of 
the country. This might help to explain why, at least 
in this first phase, central and eastern European 
countries (CEECs) displayed strong divergence in 
the organization of their research policies (Lepori et 
al, 2009). 
A further relevant factor was that reforms in re-
search policy took place in a phase where the politi-
cal organization of the country was also in a 
transition phase, with some elements of the new de-
mocratic policy regime coexisting with habits, cul-
ture, institutions and procedural rules inherited from 
the Communist system. Even revolutions are less 
abrupt than it might appear at first glance; while the 
basic institutions of policy can be replaced quickly, 
procedural rules and organizational structures of sec-
toral policies require a longer time and thus deci-
sion-making processes are likely to fall back to pre-
existing arrangements. Moreover, some of them 
might well become the predecessors of the new in-
stitutions and thus have a lasting impact (such as 
KNIPT in research policy). Further, the Polish case 
provides evidence that the deep layer of basic insti-
tutional arrangements, which had been embodied in 
long-standing practices under the Communist re-
gime, strongly impacted on collective actors’ behav-
ior despite explicit commitments to democracy and 
scientific freedom. Thus, admittedly, the reform of 
Polish research policy was a highly centralized and 
undemocratic process, where open debate was 
largely suppressed through procedural rules, author-
ity and claims of the urgency of the situation. 
Looking to the evolution in the following years, 
the specificity of the Polish case, if compared to 
countries such as Estonia and the Czech Republic, 
was that the reform led to a lock-in situation, where 
no further reforms were undertaken for almost a 
decade. Historical analysis displays that this was the 
(unintended) result of different factors: 
• Fears that reforms would entail the risk of coming 
back to the old system;  
• The coherency of the advocacy coalition at the 
power centre, as an outcome of realizing the ideal 
of the ‘Republic of Science’; and 
• The lack of a clear institutional separation be-
tween the design of policy, the allocation of fund-
ing and the beneficiaries, meaning that those who 
benefited from the funding system at the same 
time controlled the reform process. 
In a way, this reflects the idealist character of the 
‘Republic of Science’ model, but also the priority set 
by some reformers (especially Amsterdamski) in 
changing the basic rationale of science policy; the 
way interest and power relations were handled privi-
leged this objective against the design of a system 
able to evolve and redistribute power across time. 
However, in broader perspective, during the lock-
in phase the ground was prepared for the following 
reforms. We can identify three main processes at 
work: 
1. The consolidation of the Polish state, progres-
sively developing sectoral policies and, conse-
quently, ministerial authority in these domains. 
2. A broader acceptance of the irreversibility of the 
reforms, thus switching the focus from avoiding 
falling back into the Communist regime to im-
proving the new institutions. 
3. Increased confrontation with western European 
models and normative pressure from the European 
Union. 
In this account, the normative dimension of inter-
national policy transfer clearly emerges: solutions 
from abroad are adopted not because they are supe-
rior to those in place nationally, but because of con-
formity to the institutional environment. 
Again, an external event — the new Constitu-
tional Law of 1997 — triggered the reform. The ac-
tion of the ministers of science was relevant in 
managing the process in a gradual way and in reach-
ing consensus. However, in a broader view, one 
could affirm that many features of the Polish re-
search policy — such as the exclusion of political 
actors from the process, the centralization in the 
KBN of most decision-making both concerning pol-
icy design and funding, and the lack of delegation to 
an intermediary body — were too singular in the 
context of the models adopted in western European 
countries. Thus, stability of path has to be always re-
ferred to the acceptable space of solutions. This  
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suggests that in a world of increasing interdepen-
dency historical analysis of the path development for 
individual countries needs to be integrated with a 
thorough analysis — both functional and normative 
— of the space of potential solutions and of its evo-
lution across time. This would allow distinguishing 
between stable and potentially unstable paths, 
where, as in the Polish case, change might be gener-
ated by external events or by repositioning the whole 
country in the international context (in this case be-
coming a full member of the European Union). 
A final remark concerns the role of policy entre-
preneurs in the whole reform process of Polish re-
search policy. In fact, this would seem a typical case 
where individuals, thanks to the breakdown of exist-
ing structures, are given very great room to maneu-
ver to reform the system according to their own 
ideas. However, when one goes from the punctual 
analysis of the heroic reform period towards a 
broader historical perspective, the importance of 
structural factors re-emerges and, to a large extent, 
these have been embodied and enacted through the 
entrepreneurs themselves. Their function would 
seem more in facilitating and managing the reform 
process than in influencing its direction. 
In our view, there are two relevant factors in this 
context: first, the breakdown of the Communist re-
gime was so unexpected that reformers hardly had 
the time (at least concerning research policy) to de-
velop in advance a broad repertoire of solutions and, 
second, CEECs were confronted — both in the gen-
eral organization of society and in research policy — 
with a strong system of beliefs and institutional ar-
rangements in the (highly successful) market 
economies, which largely drove the direction of the 
reforms (a process further strengthened through 
rapid integration into the European Union). Breaking 
down the Communist order did not mean falling into 
a void space in which to design an alternative solu-
tion, but rather getting attracted by a stronger model 
and thus having limited possibilities of choice. 
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